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excellent political arrangement for the transaction of business; it is not a unity of persons.

These mark the points at which, I should say, Mr. Adler has not quite succeeded in his "joint" method of driving two horses abreast. His two horses are personality and social harmony. It seems to me that an unconscious deference to popular conceptions of social morality—of the kind already deprecated in his criticism of socialism—has led him to drive the social horse ahead of the personal. But it is not to be expected that any of us will succeed in driving two horses abreast; nor, I fear, that any of us will succeed in driving his philosophical chariot with less than two horses. The criticisms touch the book only in certain aspects. The book as a whole is an impressive presentation of an ethical attitude, and the attitude is marked by nobility of conception, by spiritual insight into the souls of men, and at the same time by a fairly resolute recognition of the facts of life.

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THE APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF MAN

IN Europe, at the present time, we have the exhibit of men struggling with problems of the highest complexity without an adequate equipment of scientific knowledge. Despite efforts which were made towards the end of the eighteenth century, the systematic study of man has been so neglected that in the emergency of to-day we are left without guidance other than the conflicting opinions of a limited group of statesmen. We take a certain pride, just now, in the fact that the war has forced us to look at the problems of mankind from a world point of view; but while our sympathies are going out to the aspirations and activities of the lesser and debatable nationalities, it must be insisted that, if we are to be ultimately successful in promoting the highest interests of humanity, we must be prepared to apply ourselves, with a resolution and earnestness hitherto unrealized, to the scientific study of man.

There is no escaping the fact that such a study presents the gravest difficulties. It is, for example, hard for men to overcome the feeling that human affairs are so dominated by "accident" and by the uncertain motives and wills of individuals that scientific method is here inapplicable. Then, it must be acknowledged, no one of the existing disciplines in our universities has shown the power or disposition to take up the study of man as a whole. The sociologist may demonstrate that logically his subject should embrace and coordinate the results of all humanistic studies, but as a matter of

fact this has not been done. Humanistic learning in the narrower sense (*i. e.*, the classics) provides no avenue leading to a sufficiently broad outlook; history still remains content with its chronological presentation of political events; while anthropology still limits its interest to the less civilized groups of men. On the other hand, it is but fair to reflect that the way is not open for any one existing "subject" in the university to make itself responsible for such a study, since this, of necessity, demands the coordination and co-operation of every discipline which may be included in "the humanities." Again, a further difficulty, of a practical sort, arises from the fact that the recognized division of subjects in the university has not sprung from the needs of scientific study, but is the outcome of tradition, modified by demands for the recognition of new subjects during the last fifty years. The study of man, in short, can be instituted only with the support of each of the separate departments or units into which the "College of Letters" is broken up, for each one of these represents an integral and essential aspect of the inquiry.

The first problem, then, that confronts us, in the effort to obtain recognition for the systematic study of man, is the necessity of making such an approach to the study as will gain the confidence and enlist the support of the different groups of scholars involved. What is to be desired is that the humanistic side of the university should adopt as its fundamental aim, not the separate study of philosophy, of psychology, of anthropology, of history, of geography, of languages and literatures, of economics and political science, but the unified study of man. If, however, this is to be accomplished it can only be through the convincing nature of the approach which may be offered. The cooperation sought can be hoped for only through the presentation of a set of ideas which will enable men working in different lines to see how their individual efforts may be made contributory to a great and highly desired end. It thus becomes evident that the manner in which we may propose to set about the study of man is of crucial importance.

This being the case, it is of significance that in various connections efforts are being made at the present time to mark out lines of approach to the study of man. Of these the contribution of Dr. Goldenweiser in this JOURNAL (October 10 and 24, 1918) bespeaks attention, being a serious effort entitled to consideration in an appreciative spirit.

Dr. Goldenweiser begins by pointing out that the approach desired is not to be gained by discussing the relations of established academic subjects, and proposes that we should turn directly to the facts themselves. This, it seems to me, is essential; we need a re-

turn to the whole body of facts available for the study of man unembarrassed by distinctions which have arisen through the exigencies of university teaching. But the question follows at once: are we approaching the facts themselves when, as the author proposes, we "attempt an analytical conceptualization of the *relations* of such facts" (563). What is meant by this phrase may be explained a little more fully. "An examination of a set of social data, as presented by the historical record or by modern conditions, naturally leads," Dr. Goldenweiser thinks, "to three questions: what kind of data are they? How are they related to one another in time? And what is the connection between them? This," he continues, "suggests three standpoints from which the data can be envisaged: the standpoint of *level*, . . . of *time*, . . . and of connection or *linkage*." From this beginning he goes on to develop a set of eight categories of data (objective-historical, objective-contemporaneous, psychological-historical, psychological-contemporaneous, deterministic-historical, deterministic-contemporaneous, accidental-historical, accidental-contemporaneous) the further description of which constitutes the body of his paper.

What we are concerned with here is not the detailed interest of the paper under discussion, or the wealth of illustration Dr. Goldenweiser is never at a loss to introduce, but the mode of approach which he offers as "an introduction to social science." The point then that seems to me crucial in this connection is that the proposed conceptualization of the *relations* of facts, *before the facts have been subjected to scientific treatment*, is calculated to lead to no sound or valuable result.

An illustration will best serve to bring out the force of this criticism. Dr. Goldenweiser's ultimate objective, in the paper with which we are concerned, is an analysis of the relation of the "deterministic" and "accidental" elements in human history. Briefly, his point of view is that in any given event there are certain "deterministic" elements which we may isolate, but we will also have to acknowledge "there is no denying the overwhelming weight of accidental factors" (606). "The accidental appears, after all, as predominant in history, when it comes to the particular *when*, *where*, *how*, and even *what*, of events" (605). "Thus the accidental and the deterministic appear as two inseparable ingredients of the historic process. Leave out the deterministic, and history becomes a hodge-podge of adventitious things and events, a something without rhyme or reason; leave out the accidental, and grave injustice is done to reality, for law and order is then claimed as a fact, whereas it is at best but an aspiration, a tendency, not strong enough to have

its way wholly, but fully strong enough to regulate, and to that extent to control, the stream of accidental fact" (607).

Now, as he himself is aware, what the author does here is to take certain particulars, related in chronological sequence, and reflect upon the nature of the "linkage" (to use his own expression) between them (564). Remark, he is not proposing or dealing with a scientific problem, he is simply looking at certain facts, *i. e.*, events, and thinking about the relation in which one happening stands to the next, in terms of "determinism" and "accident." As a result of this consideration it is obvious that the "accidental" features will preponderate, for the reason that the so-called "deterministic" factors can not be arrived at or discerned by contemplation, they can only be discovered through scientific investigation (if at all), and this, in the subject under discussion, has not been carried out. The approach adopted by Dr. Goldenweiser may lead to the expression of an infinite variety of opinions, in which appeal will be made to the existing body of knowledge, but it will not open the door to scientific investigation and the extension of scientific results, from which it follows that the conclusions reached by Dr. Goldenweiser may be rendered invalid at any moment through new research.

Let us accept the proposal to turn to the facts themselves, but, instead of reflecting upon the abstract relations in which the facts stand to each other, let us ask what sort of knowledge it is we want to gain. As I understand it, every science is engaged in the effort to find out "how things work" in relation to some specific aspect of the world in which we find ourselves. Every science makes the assumption that things in the world we know work in characteristic ways, and that these ways may be discovered by scientific analysis. Hence it is that the students of physics and chemistry, of astronomy, geology, and biology are not greatly concerned in regard to the relations of the sciences, for they are occupied fully in the task of analyzing the *modus operandi* through which the results we observe in nature have been and still are produced.

If we adopt this methodological point of view in the case before us, it will appear that the kind of knowledge we want in relation to man is an understanding of the ways in which things work to bring about certain results. But what results? Here we are in the presence of a difference between the aims of the student of nature and of the historian, for while the former endeavors to describe how any existing condition has come to be as it is, the latter attempts to explain *events*. The difference is marked, and is of the utmost significance in point of method. The one procedure leads to an analysis of the characteristic processes through which existing conditions have been

and are produced; the other leads to views on the "accidental," to opinions on the influence of "great men," to religious beliefs on the place of "God in history." The one method leads on to a more and more complete and objective description of the ways in which things work, the other ends in interpretations which are inevitably personal and emotionalized.

We have before us, in the form of documents and other memorials, evidences of what has taken place in the past. The historian seizes upon these materials and endeavors to "reconstruct the past." What he does is to create for himself, from the data available, a drama of events, and he does this by selecting what he deems to have been the episodes of cardinal importance, supplementing the record by the imaginative reconstruction of the motives of the participants. It is all human and romantic, and, in the hands of a master, of absorbing interest; but the story will never be the same in any two "histories," and the proportions of the "accidental" will vary with every treatment. The scientific investigator, approaching the same materials, will, on the other hand, begin with the present, and he will utilize the facts available in regard to what has happened in the past as so much evidence from which to isolate the various processes through which the existing situation or condition has come to be as it is. As a consequence, the latter procedure gives some hope of an eventual understanding and comprehension of how things work in relation to mankind, whereas the former leaves us with ever-varying statements as to the importance and significance of what has taken place. With this contrast in mind, it will readily appear that the whole question of "accident" and "determinism" in history is an outgrowth of the concentration of attention upon events, and is one that disappears as an essential matter for consideration when once the scientific attitude has been adopted.

The study of man is a fundamental interest for the world at the present time. If we profit from the experience gained in other lines of inquiry, we will see that the urgent need now is to apply the method of science in this all-important field. It may, at first sight, seem impracticable to unify studies in which every branch is distinguished by a special body of fact and a special technique of investigation; but, on second consideration, it will become evident that these differences are no greater than those which characterize the different branches of physics or biology. What we are in need of is an approach to the study of man which will orient the aims of the different "subjects," and show how all our efforts may be made contributory to a common end. What this means is that we require the statement of the scientific problem which lies back of all the data

with which our recognized "subjects" deal. As I conceive it, this problem is contained in the question: "How has man, with all the infinite variety of his activities in literature, art, thought, and handicraft come to be as we find him throughout the world to-day?" But it also means that we require a method in common—the method of science, which may for the humanist be found illustrated in the historical study of language.

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"SCIENTIFIC PREPOSSESSION" AND ANTISCIENTIFIC ANIMUS

PROFESSOR FITE'S clever caricature of scientific psychology, in the December *Atlantic*, like all clever caricature, achieves its end by seizing on a few conspicuous features of its victim; features not necessarily of vital importance; and by skilful exaggeration and subtle misrepresentation of these features, entirely obscuring the victim's real characteristics.

Against such caricaturing it is useless to argue, and undignified to protest. Where the motive is kindly, it is best to laugh with the artist. Where the motive is spiteful, serene indifference is sufficient protection. There is no reason to be concerned over Professor Fite's playing up of the "behaviorism" of a few radicals as if it were the real current of psychological opinion and method. We need not become excited when our caricaturist assumes for his own purposes that the Freudian pseudo-psychology, with its mystical Subconscious and medieval demons of complexes, is accepted by the laborious scientific psychology, slave to dull fact and grinding method, which he scornfully describes in another page. Even when, after telling us that "no one thinks of demanding . . . from the 'expert psychologist' . . . a broad and sympathetic appreciation of literature, a cultivated and instructed taste, and, above all, a thoughtful experience of life," he proceeds, without a verbal blush, to quote from "a recent writer" who is actually one of our best known American psychologists, and who has in a very high degree just this appreciation, taste, and experience: proceeds, indeed, to quote from this "recent writer's" delightful satire on experimental psychology: even then we should merely admire the philosopher's adroitness in juggling with facts. There would be reason for concern if it were probable that the cartoonist believed his caricature to be a veracious portrait; but one hesitates to assume such naïveté of Professor Fite, just as one would hesitate to assume it of Goldberg or one of the other cartoonists of the evening papers.